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HABEAS CORPUS-RETROACTIVITY OF
POST-CONVICTION RULINGS:
FINALITY AT THE EXPENSE OF
JUSTICE
Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Gilmore v. Taylor,I the United States Supreme Court held that
the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Falconer v. Lane,2 which declared un-
constitutional the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions for murder and
voluntary manslaughter, could not be applied retroactively to a state
prisoner whose conviction became final before Falconer was de-
cided.3 Applying Teague v. Lane,4 the Court determined that the Fal-
coner holding, which invalidated jury instructions practically identical
to those given at respondent Kevin Taylor's trial, could not be ap-
plied retroactively to Taylor's case because it announced a "new
rule" that was not "dictated by precedent" existing at the time of
Taylor's trial.5
This Note examines the Court's decision in Gilmore and con-
cludes that the Court adopted an unreasonably broad definition of
what constitutes a new rule under Teague. The Court's application
of Teague suggests that any time a federal habeas petitioner makes a
claim that is not directly supported by precedents that are precisely
on point, that petitioner asks for the benefit of a new rule that can-
not be applied retroactively. 6 In other words, Gilmore has made it
effectively impossible for a prisoner to bring a successful federal
1 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993).
2 905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990).
3 Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2114.
4 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Teague held that a constitutional ruling that was not "dic-
tated by precedent" existing at the time a prisoner's conviction became final constituted
a "new rule" which could not be given effect in a post-conviction federal habeas corpus
proceeding. Id. at 310.
5 Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2117-19.
6 Although Teague's bar against retroactive application of "new rules" has two very
narrow exceptions, Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-12, they are not worth mentioning here be-
cause the Court has never used either of these exceptions to apply a rule retroactively.
These exceptions will be discussed infra parts II.B. and II.C.
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habeas claim unless the state imprisoned him in open defiance of
constitutional precedents that were on point at the time of convic-
tion. As a result, the Court has practically eliminated the doctrine of
federal habeas corpus as Congress envisioned it and wiped away at
least forty years of precedent. With the exception of the few crimi-
nal cases heard on direct review, this self-imposed limitation makes
the Court powerless to overturn erroneous state convictions in all
but the most egregious cases of bad-faith state defiance. By placing
unreasonable emphasis on preserving the finality of convictions, the
Court has relinquished one of its fundamental duties and given the
states primary authority to determine what the Federal Constitution
requires of their criminal proceedings.
II. BACKGROUND
A. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
The doctrine of federal habeas corpus enables federal courts to
order a state to release or retry prisoners held in violation of the
Federal Constitution. 7 Federal habeas review can take place only
after a state conviction has become final and all other state post-
conviction remedies have been exhausted.8 Typically, federal
habeas proceedings begin at the district court level. 9 Because they
involve federal district court review of state court decisions, federal
habeas claims are often referred to as "collateral" proceedings to
distinguish them from direct appeals to the Supreme Court.10
Federal habeas corpus has its origins in the Judiciary Act of
1789.11 Initially, the doctrine of federal habeas corpus acted only to
correct jurisdictional errors made by federal courts-relief was
granted only to federal detainees who were convicted in courts that
did not have jurisdiction over their cases.' 2 During the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, federal habeas jurisdiction expanded. The
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 extended federal habeas jurisdiction to
state court convictions and allowed federal courts to grant relief in
7 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1977).
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (b) (1971) (giving United States Supreme Court and circuit
courts authority to decline and transfer habeas proceedings to the district courts).
10 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990).
11 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81.
12 Exparte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830)("[I]mprisonment under a judg-
ment cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a
nullity, if the Court has general jurisdiction of the subject, although it should be
erroneous.").
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cases where the conviction resulted from an unconstitutional law. 13
By 1953, at the latest, federal habeas relief could be granted for the
same types of constitutional errors recognizable on direct appeal.14
As civil rights and constitutional guarantees expanded in the 1960s,
the writ of habeas corpus enabled federal courts to enforce the Bill
of Rights against the states, establishing minimum standards of due
process throughout the nation.' 5
In recent years, the Rehnquist Court has severely limited the
scope of federal habeas review through a number ofjudicial innova-
tions.1 6 Among the most effective limitations on federal habeas
corpus is the Court's modification of the retroactivity doctrine in
federal habeas corpus announced in Teague v. Lane.' 7
B. RETROACTIVITY PRIOR TO TEAGUE V. LANE
In the context of federal habeas corpus, the term "retroactivity"
refers to the issue of whether a "new rule" can be applied to a fed-
eral habeas petitioner who, by definition, is a prisoner whose convic-
tion has already become final. 18 A new rule, generally speaking,' 9 is
a rule that did not exist at the time the petitioner's conviction be-
came final.20
Prior to 1965, the Court generally applied new constitutional
rules retroactively to collateral appeals, as it did to cases heard on
13 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-
54 (1988)).
14 Though some commentators have argued for an earlier date, nearly all agree that
this expansion of federal habeas review either was established by or had been estab-
lished before the case of Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See, e.g.,Joseph L. Hoff-
man, The Supreme Court's New Vision of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 1989 Sup.
CT. REV. 165, 176; James S. Liebman, More than "Slightly Retro " The Rehnquist Court's
Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
537, 538 n.3 (1990-91); Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 9, 10-11 (1990).
15 See Graham Hughes, Sandbagging Constitutional Rights: Federal Habeas Corpus and the
Procedural Default Principle, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 321, 327-28 (1987-88).
16 For a discussion of Supreme Court decisions of the past two decades limiting ac-
cess to federal habeas corpus review, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE § 28 (2d ed. 1992); CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 903-47 (3d ed. 1993).
17 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Teague is discussed infra part II.C.
18 See generally Teague, 489 U.S. at 288; Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Gil-
more v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993).
19 A precise definition is difficult to provide here because the Court has been divided
over exactly what constitutes a "new rule." More precise formulations and their applica-
tions will be discussed infra part II.C.
20 See generally Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Teague, 489 U.S. at 288;
Butler, 494 U.S. at 407.
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direct review.21 In 1965, the Supreme Court held in Linkletter v.
Walker 22 that the "Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retro-
spective effect" for new constitutional rules of criminal procedure.23
Since its decision in Linkletter, the Court occasionally refused to ap-
ply a new ruling retroactively to cases on both direct and collateral
review when it found that the new rule would excessively disrupt
preexisting law. 24 Without distinguishing between collateral and di-
rect appeals, the Court considered the following three factors in de-
termining whether to apply a ruling retroactively: "(a) the purpose
to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on
the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new
standards." 25
In a pair of minority opinions that would later have a substan-
tial impact, Justice Harlan criticized the Linkletter approach and pro-
posed a retroactivity test that would distinguish between direct and
collateral review. 26 Justice Harlan suggested that new rules should
always be applied to cases not yet final and that new rules should
not be applied to cases that had already become final.27 Justice
Harlan argued that denying retroactive application of new rules to
convictions that had already become final would preserve the finality
of state court convictions and help prevent burdensome litigation.28
Justice Harlan's suggested rule of non-retroactivity in federal
habeas cases was not absolute, however. Rather, it contemplated
21 See Roger D. Branigin III, Note, Sixth Amendment-The Evolution of the Supreme Court's
Retroactivity Doctrine: A Futile Search for Theoretical Clarity, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMiNOLOGY
1128, 1133 (1989) (citing United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 542 (1982)).
22 381 U.S. at 618.
23 Id. at 629.
24 See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (holding nonretroactive United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), which applied the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel to lineups); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (holding nonretroactive
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which established the right to counsel at inter-
rogations); Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 618 (holding nonretroactive Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), which applied the exclusionary rule to the states).
25 Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297.
26 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
27 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 675 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Desist, 394 U.S. at 256 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
28 Mackey, 401 U.S. at 691 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (cit-
ing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan,J., dissenting) ("No one,
not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a
judgment providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day
thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation on issues al-
ready resolved.")).
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two narrow exceptions. The first exception included new rules that
"place, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the crimi-
nal law-making authority to proscribe." 29 The second exception ap-
plied only to procedures " 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.' "30
Gradually, the Court embraced parts of Justice Harlan's view.
In United States v. Johnson,31 the Court held that new Fourth Amend-
ment rules should apply to non-final convictions, but not to federal
habeas claims.3 2 Five years later, in Giffith v. Kentucky, 33 the Court
accepted the first half ofJustice Harlan's proposal and held that new
constitutional rules could always provide the basis for relief on di-
rect review. It was not until Teague v. Lane,3 4 eighteen years after
Justice Harlan's separate opinions in Mackey and Desist, that the
Court expressly adopted the second half of Justice Harlan's rule,
holding that new rules of criminal procedure could not be applied in
federal habeas proceedings. 35 As will be demonstrated below, how-
ever, the Court did much more than adopt Justice Harlan's rule.
Justice Harlan's separate opinions became the precedential vehicle
through which the Court, by nearly all accounts,3 6 drastically re-
wrote the law of retroactivity.
C. THE NONRETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE
In Teague v. Lane,3 7 Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality of
the Court, held that a habeas petitioner cannot obtain relief on the
basis of a "new rule," unless the new rule falls within one of two
narrow exceptions.38 In doing so, the Court overruled nearly
twenty-five years of retroactivity law, rejecting the Linkletter ap-
proach in favor of Justice Harlan's proposed presumption of non-
retroactivity of "new rules."
29 Id. at 692 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30 Id. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Justice
Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
31 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
32 Id at 562.
33 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
34 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
35 Id at 310.
36 See, e.g., WHrrEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 16, at 786-90; Marc M. Arkin, The
Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REV.
371 (1991); Louis D. Bilionis, Legitimating Death, 91 MicH. L. REv. 1643 (1993); Barry
Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REv. 797 (1992); Hoffmann, supra note 14;
Liebman, supra note 14; Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 941 (1991).
37 489 U.S. at 288.
38 Id. at 310.
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This was not the most dramatic of the changes effected by
Teague, however. The plurality's remaining innovations modified
Justice Harlan's rule to such a degree that it has been argued that
Teague distorted rather than adopted Justice Harlan's views.39
The first modification-perhaps the most important aspect of
Teague-is the plurality's expansion of Justice Harlan's definition of
a "new rule."'40 Justice Harlan had defined a new rule as any rule
other than settled law at the time of trial and rules that fell within
the "logical compass" of established rules.41 Since Justice Harlan's
definition does not regard rules that come within the "logical com-
pass" of established precedents as new, his definition would pre-
serve the Court's habeas corpus function of extending and clarifying
constitutional rights to those situations within the "logical compass"
of its previous decisions.
The plurality in Teague modified this definition in a fashion that
was, to say the least, crafty. The plurality achieved this by articulat-
ing conflicting definitions of a new rule. 42 The Court first defined a
new rule very broadly, then it gave a much narrower definition:
In general .... a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground
or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government.
To put it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was not
dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction
became final.43
The words and examples selected in the first definition suggest
that new rules are ground-breaking decisions that overturn estab-
lished standards. This formulation, like Justice Harlan's, does not
seem to prohibit the application of an old rule to a new set of facts.
The second definition, which the plurality offered as a clarifica-
tion of the first, did far more than "put it differently," however.44
This second conception of a new rule, as it was applied in Teague and
its progeny, 45 had enormous consequences for the scope and func-
tion of federal habeas review. As Justice Brennan pointed out in
39 Friedman, supra note 36, at 811 ("One might say that the Teague decision resem-
bles Justice Harlan's views much like a kidnapping note pasted together from stray
pieces of newsprint resembles the newspaper from which it came.").
40 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
41 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 264 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
43 Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 (1987) ("[Pjer se
rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony infringes impermissibly on a criminal
defendant's right to testify on his behalf."); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986)
("Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of prisoners who are insane.")).
44 Id.
45 Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993); Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992);
Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990); Saffle v.
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dissent, "[flew decisions on appeal or collateral review are 'dictated'
by what came before. Most such cases involve a question of law that
is at least debatable ... .-"46 Justice Brennan concluded, as has prac-
tically every academic who has written about Teague, that the plural-
ity's broad definition of a new rule severely curtailed the Court's
ability to decide important constitutional questions on collateral
review.47
The plurality also modified Justice Harlan's approach to the
second exception to the bar against retroactivity.48 Initially, Justice
Harlan suggested that the second exception apply to those rules
that affected the truth-finding process. 49 Justice Harlan later re-
jected this view of the second exception in favor of an exception that
did not restrict itself only to those procedures determinative of guilt
or innocence; his ultimate formulation included any new rule that
was "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 50
The plurality combined Justice Harlan's two proposals to create a
second exception that was as narrow as possible.5' To come within
the second exception, a new rule had to affect both the accuracy of a
conviction and the fundamental fairness of the trial process. 52 The
plurality made clear that only "watershed rules of criminal proce-
dure"5 3 involving "bedrock procedural element[s]"' 54 could meet
the "fundamental fairness" requirement of its modified second ex-
ception. The plurality's constriction of Justice Harlan's second ex-
Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302 (1989).
46 Teague, 489 U.S. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47 Id at 345 (Brennan, J., dissenting); See generally Arkin, supra note 36;John Blume &
William Pratt, Understanding Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325
(1990-9 1); Richard H. Fallon & DanielJ. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991); Richard Faust et al., The Great Writ in
Action: Empirical Light on the Federal Habeas Corpus Debate, 18 N.Y.U. REv. LAw & Soc.
CHANGE 637 (1990-91); Friedman, supra note 36; Liebman, supra note 14; Patchel, supra
note 36; RonaldJ. Tabak &J. Mark Lane,Judicial Activism and Legislative "Reform" of Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis of Recent Developments and Current Proposals, 55 ALBANY
L. REV. 1 (1991); Weisberg, supra note 14; Branigin, supra note 21; Recent Develop-
ments, The Court Declines in Fairness-Teague v. Lane, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 164
(1990); Karl N. Metzner, Note, Retroactivity, Habeas Corpus, and the Death Penalty: An Un-
holy Alliance, 41 DUKE L.J. 160 (1991).
48 Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
49 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
50 Mackey v United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurrring in part
and dissenting in part).
51 Teague, 489 U.S. at 312 ("We believe it desirable to combine the accuracy of the
Desist version of the second exception with the Mackey requirement that the procedure at
issue must implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial.").
52 Id. at 315.
53 Id. at 311.
54 Id. at 315.
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ception, like its expansion of his definition of a new rule, placed a
greater restriction on habeas corpus than was intended by Justice
Harlan.
To complicate matters further, the plurality's holding forced it
to rearrange the order in which it decided issues on collateral re-
view. Until Teague, the Court would ordinarily decide upon the mer-
its of a case, and upon finding that it had created a new rule, the
Court would determine if the rule could be given retroactive effect,
either in that case or a subsequent case, to those similarly situated. 55
In Teague, the plurality made retroactivity a threshold question that
must be decided before reaching the merits.56
The plurality's explanation for addressing retroactivity before
reaching the merits is somewhat confusing. The Court explained
that if it ruled favorably on the merits but found that its ruling con-
stituted a new rule, it would be faced with two unacceptable choices:
(1) to permit retroactive application of its ruling to the petitioner
but to no others, or (2) to deny retroactive application to everyone,
including the petitioner. 57 The plurality rejected the first alternative
because it demanded uneven application of new rules to similarly
situated persons.58 The second alternative could not be entertained
because it would result in a purely prospective rule, which the Court
reasoned would be invalid as an advisory opinion. 59 The plurality
concluded by stating:
We therefore hold that, implicit in the retroactivity approach we adopt
today, is the principle that habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle
to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those
rules would be applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral re-
view through one of the two exceptions we have articulated. 60
D. TEAGUE'S PROGENY
In a series of Supreme Court cases, the major aspects of the
plurality's opinion in Teague gained support from majorities of the
Court.61 This subsection discusses several of the most important
55 See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 523 (1968).
56 Teague, 489 U.S. at 316.
57 Id. at 315-16.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. (emphasis in original).
61 See, e.g., Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993); Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482
(1992); Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990);
Saffie v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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cases applying and elaborating on Teague's nonretroactivity
doctrine.
The first of these cases, Penry v. Lynaugh,62 made Teague applica-
ble to death penalty cases. Perhaps the most important aspect of
Penry, however, is its application of Teague's definition of a new rule.
In Penry, Justice O'Connor, joined by the dissenters in Teague,63 held
that Penry's petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus did not ask
for the benefit of a new rule.64 Penry claimed his death sentence
was unconstitutional because the jury was not instructed that it
could consider mitigating evidence pertaining to Penry's mental re-
tardation when deciding whether to sentence him to death.65 Jus-
tice O'Connor held that the rule sought by Penry was dictated by
Lockett v. Ohio6 6 and Eddings v. Oklahoma,6 7 which held that sentenc-
ing juries were entitled to hear all possible mitigating evidence in
making capital decisions. 68 However, in light of a previous Supreme
Court decision rejecting the same claim made by Penry,69 the Penry
Court's holding is permissible only under a very broad understand-
ing of the phrase "dictated by precedent."
Penry demonstrated that the Court was sharply divided over the
meaning of a new rule. In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that "it
challenges the imagination to think that today's result is 'dictated'
by our prior cases."' 70 Justice Scalia concluded that the majority's
narrow interpretation of a new rule could not be reconciled with
Teague: "It is rare that a principle of law as significant as that in
Teague is adopted and gutted in the same Term."' 71 The Penry dis-
62 492 U.S. at 302. In Penry, the Court decided whether Penry's death sentence was
unconstitutional because the Texas death penalty statute failed to instruct juries to con-
sider certain mitigating factors, such as mental retardation, when deciding whether a
defendant should be sentenced to death. Id. at 274.
63 Id at 314-19 (majority opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens, J.).
64 Id. at 315.
65 Id. The Texas statute directed the jury to consider three factors: (a) whether the
defendant committed the acts which caused the victim's death deliberately and with the
reasonable expectation that the victim or another would die, (b) whether the defendant
would continue to pose a threat to society in the future, and (c) whether the conduct of
the defendant was unreasonable in response to any provocation the defendant may have
received from the deceased. Id. at 310 (citing Tax. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art.
37.071(b) (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
66 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
67 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
68 Penry, 492 U.S. at 328.
69 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of the Texas
death penalty statute because it could be interpreted broadly enough to permit the jury
to consider mitigating evidence).
70 Penry, 492 U.S. at 352 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71 Id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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senters seemed to believe that a rule could be "dictated" by prior
precedent only if those precedents could support no other result.72
For the majority, on the other hand, a rule was not new if it had
compelling support in previous precedents. The victory of the Penry
majority, which consisted primarily of the Teague dissenters, offered
hope that the nonretroactivity doctrine would not be the insur-
mountable barrier that many critics 73 had feared.
A year later, however, in Butler v. McKellar,74 the Penry dissent-
ers, joined by Justice O'Connor, found themselves in the majority. 75
Purporting to clarify the Teague standard, the Butler Court articu-
lated an even broader definition of a new rule than the one set out
in Teague. Through Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court made clear
that general interpretations of the phrase "dictated by precedent"
would no longer be tolerated: "[T]he fact that a . . . decision is
within the 'logical compass' of an earlier decision, or indeed that it
is 'controlled' by a prior decision, is not conclusive for purposes of
deciding whether the current decision is a 'new rule' under
Teague." 76 The Court concluded that a legal rule requested by a pe-
titioner was new if, in light of precedent existing at the time of the
petitioner's trial, the correctness of the rule was "susceptible to de-
bate among reasonable minds." 77 Emphasizing the states' interest
in the finality of convictions, the Court created this definition to
"validate[] reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing prece-
dents made by state courts even though they are shown to be con-
trary to later decisions."78
The Butler formulation, reaffirmed in two other cases that
year,7 9 is an enormously powerful tool for restricting access to fed-
72 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (all decisions are new ex-
cept those "that a judge acting in good faith and with care should have known" the
Supreme Court would render).
73 See supra note 47.
74 494 U.S. 407 (1990). While in police custody on an assault and battery charge,
Butler confessed to an unrelated murder, for which he was convicted and sentenced to
death. Id. at 408-10. Butler sought habeas relief on the ground that police interrogated
him about the murder after he had retained an attorney for the assault charge, relying
on Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988). Id. at 408-11. Roberson, decided after
Butler's conviction became final, held that interrogation initiated after a suspect has re-
quested counsel for a separate charge violates the Fifth Amendment. 486 U.S. at 682.
The Court denied Butler relief, holding that Roberson announced a new rule that could
not be applied retroactively. Butler, 494 U.S. at 409.
75 Butler, 494 U.S. at 408-16 (majority opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ.).
76 Id. at 415.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 414.
79 Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
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eral habeas corpus. Under this broad definition, a state prisoner can
obtain habeas relief only when "the state court's rejection of the
constitutional challenge was so clearly invalid under then-prevailing
legal standards that the decision could not be defended by any rea-
sonable jurist."8 0 If taken literally, the "susceptible to debate
among reasonable minds" definition of a new rule replaces the in-
dependent, de novo standard of review that had previously applied to
habeas corpus proceedings81 with a highly deferential standard akin
to the minimum rationality standard reserved for the actions of a
legislature.82 This standard renders federal habeas corpus courts
powerless to determine the correct interpretation of federal rights.
Instead, the federal courts must defer to any state judgment that is
reasonable, even if incorrect. This development prompted Justice
Brennan to remark, "[t]he Court has finally succeeded in its thinly
veiled crusade to eviscerate Congress' habeas corpus regime." 83
In two 1992 decisions, Stringer v. Black84 and Wright v. West, 85
the Court again changed directions. In Stringer, the habeas peti-
tioner challenged his death sentence on the ground that an instruc-
tion regarding an aggravating factor given to his trial jury was
unconstitutionally vague.86 The Federal District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi, followed by the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, denied relief.87 The Supreme Court reversed.
To reach this result, four of the Justices from the Butler majority,88
joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens,89 gave retroactive effect to
two Supreme Court decisions that had been decided after petitioner
Stringer had been convicted. 90 The Court held that both decisions
were dictated by precedent and therefore did not announce new
80 Butler, 494 U.S. at 417-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
82 Cf Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2490 (1992) (plurality opinion) ("[A] federal
habeas court must defer to the state court's decision rejecting the claim unless that deci-
sion is patently unreasonable.") (internal quotations omitted) (citing Butler, 494 U.S. at
422 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
83 Butler, 494 U.S. at 418 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992).
85 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992).
86 Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1135.
87 Id. at 1134.
88 ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor and Kennedy. Stringer, 112
S. Ct. at 1133.
89 Id.
90 Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1133-40. The cases that were applied retroactively were
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) and Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738





The Stringer decision is somewhat difficult to reconcile with But-
ler. The fact that the lower courts in Stringer did not conclude that
Stringer's claim for relief and the post-conviction cases upon which
he relied were dictated by prior precedent attests that the ruling
sought by Stringer was "susceptible to debate among reasonable
minds." Consequently, under a literal interpretation of Butler,
Stringer's claim should have failed as a new rule. The Court ex-
plained its result by qualifying the language of Butler: "Reasonable-
ness . . . is an objective standard, and the ultimate decision . . . is
based on an objective reading of the relevant cases. The short an-
swer.., is that the Fifth Circuit made a serious mistake... "92 The
Stringer Court, with its emphasis on an "objective standard," seemed
to equate reasonableness with correctness to a greater extent than
did the Butler Court.
In Wright v. West,93 the debate over whether Butler's reasonable-
ness standard should be applied literally or objectively continued in
dicta. 94 In a plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas argued for a literal interpretation of
Butler: "If a state court has reasonably rejected the legal claim as-
serted by a habeas petitioner under existing law, then the claim
seeks the benefit of a 'new' rule under Butler, and is therefore not
cognizable on habeas under Teague." 95 Justice Thomas recognized
that this approach "implicitly questioned" the previously applicable
de novo standard of review because it forced federal habeas courts to
"defer to the state court's decision rejecting the claim unless that
decision is patently unreasonable. ' 96
In a concurring opinion joined by Justices Blackmun and Ste-
vens, Justice O'Connor defined a new rule more narrowly:
Even though we have characterized the new rule inquiry as whether
"reasonable jurists" could disagree as to whether a result is dictated
by precedent, the standard for determining when a case establishes a
new rule is "objective," and the mere existence of conflicting authority
does not necessarily mean a rule is new. If a proferred factual distinc-
tion between the case under consideration and pre-existing precedent
does not change the force with which the precedent's underlying prin-
91 Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1140.
92 Id.
93 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992).
94 The Court unanimously agreed that respondent West was not entitled to federal
habeas relief, but the Justices disagreed over the standard of review that applied to his
unsuccessful claim. Id. at 2484-503.
95 Id. at 2490 (plurality opinion).
96 Id. at 2489-90 (plurality opinion) (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 417, 422
(1990)).
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ciple applies, the distinction is not meaningful, and any deviation from
precedent is not reasonable. 97
UnderJustice O'Connor's approach, deference to minimally reason-
able state court judgments is not required. Accordingly, justice
O'Connor rejected Justice Thomas' suggestion that the Court's ret-
roactivity jurisprudence conflicted with de novo review, insisting that
the Court has "always held that federal courts have an independent
obligation to say what the law is."98
In 1993, a majority of the Court once again endorsed a broad
definition of a new rule in Graham v. Collins.9 9 Relying on Penry v.
Lynaugh, °0 0 Graham claimed that his death sentence violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the Texas death pen-
alty statute limited the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence of
Graham's youth, family background and positive character traits.10°
The majority, comprised of the four dissenters in Penry and Justice
Thomas, engaged in a narrow reading of Penry.10 2 The majority
maintained that the extension of Penry, which involved unique miti-
gating evidence of mental retardation, to Graham's case, which in-
volved a different sort of mitigating evidence, was not dictated by
precedent.'0 3 Consequently, the Court held that Penry could not
provide the basis for habeas relief and denied Graham's petition.10 4
In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens
and O'Connor, argued that Graham's claim was controlled by
Pery.105 Justice Souter pointed out that both Graham and Penry
alleged that the Texas death penalty statute limited ajury's ability to
consider mitigating evidence.' 0 6 The fact that the mitigating evi-
dence in Graham's case differed from the evidence in Penry had no
affect on the applicability of the legal rule behind Penry, according to
the dissent.'0 7
As the above cases indicate, "new rule" jurisprudence had be-
come somewhat unpredictable by the time the Court decided Gilmore
v. Taylor.'0 8 Much of this confusion was the unavoidable result of
97 Id at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
98 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
99 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993) (majority opinion of White,J.,joined by Rehnquist, Cj., and
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.).
100 492 U.S. 302 (1989); see supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
101 Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 895.
102 Id at 901-03.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 903.
105 Id at 917 (Souter, J., dissenting).
106 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
107 Id (Souter, J., dissenting).
108 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993).
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Teague, which forces federal habeas courts to draw what one com-
mentator has called a "conceptually impossible distinction between
a ruling that follows ineluctably from precedent and one which con-
cededly expands precedent . . . in a judicial world where courts
rarely acknowledge that they do any more than draw ineluctable
conclusions from precedent."' 10 9 The Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit seemed aware of this when it first decided Gilmore:
It is often difficult to determine whether a case extends prior prece-
dent, or merely applies it in a somewhat different factual context. The
lines are fuzzy; in drawing them we are keenly aware that terms such as
"fact," "law," "precedent," and "reasonable" are pliable, and hence
susceptible to contrary interpretations .... Suffice it to say that dis-
cerning the domain of a given rule and marking the precise point at
which its younger sibling, rather than it, applies is more an art than a
science. 110
The remainder of this Note discusses whether the Supreme Court's
treatment of this problem in Gilmore has done anything to stabilize
its doctrine of nonretroactivity.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. THE FACTS
On September 14, 1985, Kevin Taylor killed Scott Siniscalchi,
his ex-wife's lover."I' Prior to the homicide, Taylor and Siniscalchi
had a tense relationship.1 12 According to Taylor, he first encoun-
tered Siniscalchi in November 1984, when he came upon Siniscalchi
andJoyce, Taylor's wife, "kissing and embracing" in a parked car. 1
3
After her divorce from Taylor, Joyce began living with Sinis-
calchi.114 Taylor and Siniscalchi exchanged heated words on a few
occasions when Siniscalchi would bring Taylor's daughter, Katie, to
Taylor's trailer for parental visits.' 15 Taylor also testified that Sinis-
calchi "ridiculed and antagonized him when both men were working
at a fair."" l 6
On the night of the killing, Taylor called Joyce at approximately
1:00 a.m. According to Taylor, he often called her at this time be-
cause she worked late. The two agreed that Taylor would pick up
109 Weisberg, supra note 14, at 22-23.
110 Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d 441, 445-46 (7th Cir. 1992).
111 Id. at 442-43.
112 Id.
113 Brief of Respondent at 1, Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112 (No. 91-1738) (1993).
114 Id.
115 Taylor, 954 F.2d at 443.
116 Id.
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Katie at Joyce's home later that morning.1 ' After Taylor
remembered that he had made other plans for that morning, he
called Joyce back to arrange another time to pick up Katie.' 18 This
time, Siniscalchi answered and refused to let him speak with Joyce.
Taylor then asked if Siniscalchi could bring Katie to meet him at the
city pool the next morning. After Siniscalchi declined, Taylor of-
fered to pick up Katie at that moment; Siniscalchi again refused.' 19
Angered by Siniscalchi's obstinancy, Taylor drove to Joyce's
home. Upon arriving there, Taylor took a hunting knife out of his
car and put it in his pants. 120 Taylor testified that he could hear
Katie crying from outside ofJoyce's apartment.1 2 ' Taylor pounded
on the door, then kicked it in after nobody answered. When Taylor
entered the apartment, Katie was sitting on the floor nearJoyce and
Siniscalchi, who were in bed together. 22 Taylor testified that when
he reached for Katie, Siniscalchi "started to roll out of bed and
looked like he was reaching for something-I don't know-but
that's when I jumped on him."' 123 Taylor stated that after struggling
with Joyce and Siniscalchi, "finally they threw me into the wall and I
hit my head, and that's when I grabbed the knife."' 24 Taylor
stabbed Siniscalchi seven times. 125 Joyce testified that before leav-
ing, Taylor told her "I love you."' 126 Siniscalchi was pronounced
dead by paramedics when they arrived at the apartment. 27 Police
arrested Taylor at his home later that morning. 128
B. THE TRIAL
At trial, Taylor admitted that he killed Siniscalchi, but claimed
that he was guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder be-
cause he had acted under a sudden and intense passion provoked by
Siniscalchi. 129 The trial judge concluded that Taylor had presented








123 Brief of Respondent at 3, Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112 (No. 91-1738) (1993).
124 li at 3-4.
125 Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112, 2114 (1993).
126 Brief of Respondent at 4, Gilmore (No. 91-1738).
127 Id.





The instructions given to the jury at Taylor's trial were for all
practical purposes identical to the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions
on murder and voluntary manslaughter. 1 3 The instruction for mur-
der and the instruction for manslaughter were somewhat similar.13 2
According to the instructions, murder had two elements: (a) that
the defendant performed the acts that caused the victim's death and
(b) that the defendant intended or knew that his acts would result in
death or great bodily harm to the victim.' 33 Voluntary manslaugh-
ter consisted of three elements. The first two elements were the
same as the two elements of murder.134 The third element of volun-
tary manslaughter was a mitigating mental state: either a sudden
and intense passion resulting from serious provocation or an honest
belief that deadly force was necessary to prevent death or serious
131 Id. at 2115. See ILLINOIS PATrERNJURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL §§ 7.02 and 7.04
(2d ed. 1981).
132 The instructions given at Taylor's trial were as follows:
To sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove the following propositions:
First: That the Defendant performed the acts which caused the death of Scott
Siniscalchi; and
Second: That when the Defendant did so he intended to kill or do great bodily
harm to Scott Siniscalchi; or he knew that his act would cause death or great bodily
harm to Scott Siniscalchi; or he knew that his acts created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to Scott Siniscalchi; or he was committing the offense of
home invasion.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these
propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the De-
fendant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these
propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the
Defendant not guilty.
To sustain the charge of voluntary manslaughter, the evidence must prove the
following propositions:
First: That the Defendant performed the acts which caused the death of Scott
Siniscalchi; and
Second: that when the Defendant did so he intended to kill or do great bodily
harm to Scott Siniscalchi; or he knew that such acts would [sic] death or great bodily
harm to Scott Siniscalchi; or he knew that such acts created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to Scott Siniscalchi;
Third: That when the Defendant did so he acted under a sudden and intense
passion, resulting from serious provocation by another.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these
propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the De-
fendant guilty.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these
propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the
Defendant not guilty.
As stated previously, the Defendant is charged with committing the offense of
murder and voluntary manslaughter. If you find the Defendant guilty, you must
find him guilty of either offense; but not both. On the other hand, if you find the
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injury.13 5
The jury found Taylor guilty of murder, and he was sentenced
to prison for a term of thirty-five years. 136
C. THE STATE POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS
After Taylor's direct appeal failed, he filed a petition for state
postconviction relief.'3 7 The circuit court dismissed Taylor's peti-
tion. 138 While Taylor's appeal was pending, the Illinois Supreme
Court invalidated the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions on murder
and voluntary manslaughter in People v. Reddick.' 3 9 Nevertheless, the
court of appeals affirmed the denial of postconviction relief because
Reddick invalidated the jury instructions on the basis of state law
rather than constitutional error, which must exist before postconvic-
tion relief can be granted. 140 The Illinois Supreme Court denied
Taylor's request for leave to appeal. 14 1
D. THE FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS ACTION
With no other state remedies available, Taylor brought a fed-
eral habeas corpus action in the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois, asserting that the pattern jury instruc-
tions given at his trial violated due process. 142 Eleven days later, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declared precisely that in
the separate case of Falconer v. Lane.143 Falconer held the instructions
unconstitutional because they failed to explain to the jury that it
could not return a murder verdict if it found that the defendant pos-
sessed a mitigating mental state. 144 Nonetheless, the district court
denied Taylor relief, holding that Teague v. Lane precluded applica-
tion of Falconer to Taylor's claim because Falconer announced a "new
rule" that was not settled at the time of Taylor's conviction. 145
The Seventh Circuit, in an unanimous opinion written by Judge
Flaum, reversed. 146 In an effort to make sense of the Supreme
Court's doctrine of nonretroactivity, the court articulated a two-part
'35 Id
136 Id at 2115.
137 Id
138 Id
139 526 N.E.2d 141 (I1. 1988).
140 Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2115.
141 Id
142 Id at 2116.
143 905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990).
144 Id. at 1137.
145 Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2116.
146 Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993).
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test to determine whether or not a case announced a new rule under
Teague. 14 7 The first part of the test asks whether the case clearly falls
into one of two categories-if it overrules or makes a clear break
from prior decisions, it is a new rule, while if it applies a case that is
almost directly on point to an analagous set of facts, it is not.148 If
the case does not clearly fall into either of the categories, then the
second part of the test is used to determine "(1) whether the case at
issue departs from previous rulings by lower courts or state courts,
and (2) the level of generality of prior precedent in light of the fac-
tual context in which that precedent arose." 149
Applying part one of its test, the court determined that Falconer
did not depart from precedent and that there was no precedent di-
rectly on point at the time Falconer was decided. 150 Consequently,
the court concluded that the Falconer rule was neither new nor old in
an obvious sense. 15 1
Next, the Seventh Circuit applied the second step of its analy-
sis. 152 First, the court explained that Falconer did not depart from
the holdings of any lower federal or state courts, since no court ever
held that the instructions at issue in Falconer and Taylor were consti-
tutionally adequate. 153
Moving to part two of the second step-"the level of generality
of prior precedent in light of the factual context in which that prece-
dent arose"-the court looked for cases that stated rules specific
enough to invalidate the instructions given at Taylor's trial. 154 The
court cited two cases that satisfied this criterion: Boyde v. Califor-
nia 155 and Connecticut v. Johnson.1 56 Boyde held that when ambiguous
jury instructions create a reasonable likelihood that a jury will apply
the instructions in an invalid manner, such instructions are them-
selves invalid. 157 Johnson held that an instruction that prevented the
jury from considering evidence that may have exculpated the de-
fendant violated his due process rights.' 58 The court pointed out
that any distinctions that could be made between its case and Boyde
147 Id. at 448.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 451.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 452.
154 Id.
155 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
156 460 U.S. 73 (1983).
157 Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380.
158 Johnson, 460 U.S. at 84-85.
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and Johnson were insignificant. 159 The Court therefore concluded
that Falconer did not announce a new rule but was simply an applica-
tion of the rules in Boyde and Johnson to a similar set of facts.' 60 Ac-
cordingly, the Court allowed retroactive application of Falconer and
granted Taylor's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.' 6 '
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether Falconer could be retroactively applied to federal habeas
cases under Teague and the line of cases that followed it.162
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
In a 7-2 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Writing for the major-
ity, 16 3 ChiefJustice Rehnquist held that Falconer was not compelled
by precedent existing at the time of Taylor's conviction and was
therefore a new rule that could not be applied retroactively under
Teague.164 To support this conclusion, the Court first distinguished
Boyde v. California 16 5 and Connecticut v. Johnson,166 the cases cited by
the Seventh Circuit in support of its holding.' 67 The Court also re-
jected the Respondent's argument that the line of cases establishing
a right to present a defense mandated the result in Falconer.168 Fi-
nally, the Court concluded that the Falconer rule did not fall into one
of the Teague exceptions.169
The Supreme Court found Boyde inapposite because that case
involved a capital sentencing instruction.' 70 Claiming that capital
sentencing cases implicate the Eighth Amendment, the Court rea-
soned that the Constitution requires a greater degree of accuracy in
fact finding in capital sentencing cases than it does in other types of
proceedings.' 7 ' The Court asserted that outside of the capital sen-
tencing context, instructions involving errors of state law may not
159 Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d 441, 453 (7th Cir. 1992).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 454.
162 Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112, 2116 (1993).
163 ChiefJustice Rehnquist was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and, in all
but footnote 3 of the majority opinion, Souter.
164 Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2119.
165 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
166 460 U.S. 73 (1983).
167 Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2117-18.
168 Id at 2118-19.
169 Id. at 2119.




provide the basis for federal habeas relief.172
The Court distinguishedJohnson because the instruction in that
case created a presumption of fact that had the effect of relieving the
State of its burden of proving an element of the crime, whereas Tay-
lor only involved an error which created the risk that a jury would
disregard the respondent's affirmative defense. l7 3 The Court re-
fused to accept the Seventh Circuit's contention that the distinction
between an element of a crime and an affirmative defense were in-
significant as long as a defendant's right to present exculpating evi-
dence was at stake. 174 Instead, the Court insisted that affirmative
defenses were not entitled to constitutional protection. 175
In addition to the precedents cited by the Seventh Circuit, the
Respondent cited additional cases that related to the fundamental
right of a defendant to present a defense.' 76 The Court acknowl-
edged that it had previously recognized that "the Constitution guar-
antees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense."' 177 The Court reasoned, however, that these
words did not apply to restrictions imposed on a defendant's ability
to present an affirmative defense because no prior case specifically
prohibited such restrictions. 178
Having determined that the Falconer rule was new, the Court
turned to the issue of whether the rule fell under one of the two
Teague exceptions. 17 9 The Court quickly decided that the rule did
not decriminalize a class of conduct and moved on to the second
exception. 80 The Court held the second exception inapplicable as
well, acknowledging that while the new rule may improve the accu-
racy of criminal convictions, it was not the sort of procedure that the
Court regarded as so fundamental that it was "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty."''1
B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE
Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice
172 Id.
173 Id. at 2118.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986); California v. Trombetta, 467
U.S. 479 (1984); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S.
95 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)).
177 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
178 Id. at 2118.
179 Id. at 2119.
180 Id.
181 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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White, agreed with the majority that the Falconer holding constituted
a new rule.182 She wrote separately, however, to express her belief
that the majority engaged in an overly narrow reading of the Court's
cases that was subject to misapplication. 8 a3 According to Justice
O'Connor, the majority came too close to declaring that the Falconer
rule was not only new but incorrect. 8 4 Justice O'Connor believed
that the "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds" standard
set out in Butler v. McKellar 1s5 would have provided a more parsimo-
nious means of achieving the result reached by the majority.' 8 6 Ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor, the Falconer rule was new because it
was at least subject to debate among reasonable minds.'8 7
C. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S DISSENT
Justice Blackmun, in a dissent joined by Justice Stevens, criti-
cized the Court for failing to acknowledge the applicability of the
second Teague exception, which permits retroactive application of
"watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding."'18 Justice Black-
mun explained that the rule announced in Falconer fell under the
second exception because it was essential to a fair trial and an accu-
rate conviction.18 9
The dissent tried to demonstrate this by calling attention to the
unconstitutional treatment that Taylor suffered in the absence of the
Falconer rule. First, Justice Blackmun claimed that the erroneous in-
structions in this case applied an ex post facto law by equating murder
with manslaughter at Taylor's trial, while at the time Taylor commit-
ted the offense Illinois law distinguished between the two. 190 Sec-
ond, Justice Blackmun contended that since the jury instructions
prevented the jury from even considering Taylor's provocation de-
fense, the accuracy of his conviction was severely diminished.191 Fi-
nally, the dissent asserted that the judge violated Taylor's Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial by preventing the jury
from considering his defense.' 92
182 Id. at 2120 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
183 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
184 Id. at 2123 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
185 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
186 Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2120 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
187 Ik (O'Connor, J., concurring).
188 Id at 2123 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
189 Id. at 2129 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
190 Id at 2126 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 2127 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).




This Note criticizes the Gilmore decision because it denied Re-
spondent Kevin Taylor a just resolution of the constitutional issue
raised by his claim. Two factors effected this denial-the Court's
excessively broad nonretroactivity doctrine and the Court's unprin-
cipled application of that doctrine. Given the existence of these fac-
tors, an accurate predictive theory that will enable lower courts to
resolve retroactivity issues remains elusive. In an attempt to ad-
dress this problem, this Note will discuss reforms designed to nar-
row the definition of a new rule and reduce the uncertainty
surrounding the Court's approach to retroactivity.
A. THE NONRETROACTIVITY BARRIER
The Court's nonretroactivity doctrine is more concerned with a
state's interest in the finality of its judgments than it is with deter-
mining whether justice has been served. The majority's treatment
of Kevin Taylor's claim provides an example. In order to avoid
reaching the merits of the constitutional issue raised by Taylor, the
majority engaged in a complicated discussion of the threshold issue
of retroactivity.193
In the absence of a Teague inquiry, the issue in Gilmore would
have been fairly clear, and the Court would have decided Taylor's
claim. Taylor argued that he was erroneously convicted because the
jury instructions given at his trial precluded the jury from returning
his requested verdict of voluntary manslaughter. 194 It was undis-
puted that the instructions given at Taylor's trial created the possi-
bility that the jury could return a verdict of guilty on the murder
charge even if they found that Taylor had proven the elements of
manslaughter.1 95 Giving such instructions in a state that distin-
guishes between murder and manslaughter is an obvious error. For
a unanimous Seventh Circuit, as well as Justice Blackmun and Jus-
tice Stevens, that error violated the Constitution. 9 6 At the very
least, one would expect that the issue presented in Gilmore-whether
or not the instructions given at his trial violated the Constitution-
would be resolved by the majority.
However, the majority's Teague analysis prevented it from
reaching this issue. Under Teague and its progeny, the Court could
193 Id. at 2116.
194 Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d 441, 442 (7th Cir. 1992).
195 Brief of Petitioner at 12, Gilmore (No. 91-1738); Taylor, 954 F.2d at 450; Gilmore,
113 S. Ct. at 2118.
196 Taylor, 954 F.2d at 450; Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2129 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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not decide upon the constitutionality of the jury instructions unless
it first determined that the ruling sought by Taylor was "dictated by
precedent" and that the state courts' rejection of Taylor's claim was
unreasonable. 197 Otherwise, the Court's decision would constitute
a "new rule" which cannot be announced on collateral review under
Teague.198 The Court concluded that Taylor's claim did not meet
these requirements and reversed the Seventh Circuit's grant of fed-
eral habeas relief.1 99
As Gilmore demonstrates, the bar against retroactivity detracts
from analysis of constitutional issues. Rather than determining the
merit of a claim under the Constitution, federal habeas review has
degenerated into a determination of whether one decision dictates
another or whether reasonable persons may take exception to a
given application of precedent.
B. TAYLOR'S CLAIM DID NOT INVOLVE A NEW RULE
While the nonretroactivity barrier may itself be undesirable,
perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Court's decision in Gilmore
is that Taylor's claim should have surmounted that barrier. This
section argues that the Seventh Circuit's approach, which led to the
conclusion that Taylor did not seek the benefit of a new rule, was
more sensible than the analyses employed in any of the Supreme
Court's three opinions in Gilmore.200 In rejecting the Seventh Cir-
cuit's analysis or, in the dissent's case, failing to defend it, the Court
only added to the confusion surrounding the Teague inquiry.
1. The Majority Opinion
In order to conclude that Taylor sought the benefit of a new
rule, the majority had to distinguish three sources of support for
Taylor's claim.20 1 The first two were the precedents cited by the
Seventh Circuit as dictating the result in Falconer: Boyde v. Califor-
nia20 2 and Connecticut v. Johnson.203 The third basis of support con-
197 Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2116.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 2119.
200 For praise of the Seventh Circuit's analysis, see MarshallJ. Hartman, To Be or Not to
Be a "New Rule". The Non-Retroactivity of Newly Recognized Constitutional Rights After Convic-
tion, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 53 (1992).
201 Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2117-19.
202 494 U.S. 370 (1990) (holding that a jury instruction is void where there is a rea-
sonable chance that the jury applied the instruction in a way that prevents consideration
of "constitutionally relevant" evidence).
203 460 U.S. 73 (1983) (holding that jury instructions are unconstitutional if they lead
the jury to ignore exculpatory evidence).
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sisted of a separate line of cases cited by Taylor that established the
right to present a defense. 20 4 Taylor argued that these cases dic-
tated the conclusion that the jury instructions given at his trial vio-
lated due process, even if Falconer, Boyde, and Johnson did not
exist. 20 5 Justice Rehnquist distinguished these precedents from
Taylor's case by overstating the importance of factual differences.
First, Justice Rehnquist contended that Boyde, which held that a
jury instruction is unconstitutional when there is a reasonable likeli-
hood that the jury applied that instruction in a way that prevented
the consideration of "constitutionally relevant" evidence, could not
compel the Seventh Circuit's decision in Falconer.208 Justice Rehn-
quist claimed that since Boyde involved a capital case, requiring a
"greater degree of accuracy and fact-finding" under the Eighth
Amendment, it could not be applied to Falconer, a noncapital
case. 20 7 In noncapital cases, the Court "never said that the possibil-
ity of a jury misapplying state law gives rise to federal constitutional
error. To the contrary .... instructions that contain errors of state
law may not form the basis for federal habeas relief."20 8
The majority's distinction between capital and noncapital cases
cannot be defended. As both the concurrence and the dissent
pointed out, "Boyde did not purport to limit ... that standard to
capital cases, nor have we so limited it."209 The concurrence and
the dissent asserted that the majority's limitation contradicted Estelle
v. McGuire,2 10 a case in which the Boyde standard was applied to up-
hold an instruction in a noncapital case.211
The immediate ramifications of the majority's capi-
tal/noncapital distinction reveal its weaknesses. First of all, it im-
plies that erroneous jury instructions cannot create constitutional
error except in capital cases relating to the Eighth Amendment. As
Justice O'Connor pointed out, this implication results from the ma-
jority's inaccurate interpretation of McGuire.212 What McGuire really
held was that a "mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level
204 Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2118 (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986); Califor-
nia v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973);
Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)).
205 Brief of Respondent at 23-38, Gilmore (No. 91-1738).
206 Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2117-18.
207 Id. at 2117.
208 Id. (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991)).
209 Id. at 2121 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also id. at 2125 n.2 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
210 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991).
211 Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2121 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
212 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
998 [Vol. 84
RETROACTIVITY AND HABEAS CORPUS
of a constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal
habeas. ' 213 Although the Court in McGuire did not hold that the
erroneous instruction at issue violated the Constitution, the fact that
the Court applied the Boyde standard to the instruction at all "belies
any assertion that erroneous instructions can violate due process
only in capital cases." 2 14
By limiting the Boyde standard to the capital context, the major-
ity also implied that evidence cannot be "constitutionally relevant"
unless it relates to a capital case. 215 If this were true, a noncapital
defendant could be denied the opportunity to testify, cross-examine
witnesses and present a defense. It is hard to imagine how such an
assertion can be reconciled with the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process guarantee. As the concurrence pointed out, constitutional
provisions other than the Eighth Amendment have established a
right to present "constitutionally relevant" evidence. 2 16 Without
the opportunity to have this evidence considered, this right would
be meaningless.
The majority dismissed the remaining bases of support for Tay-
lor's claim because they did not deal with an affirmative defense, as
Taylor's case did.2 17 Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the Seventh
Circuit's interpretation of Connecticut v. Johnson2 18 as establishing a
"due process principle" that instructions are unconstitutional if they
lead "the jury to ignore exculpatory evidence in finding the defend-
ant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt." 2 19 Justice Rehn-
quist stressed thatJohnson involved an instruction which created an
erroneous presumption as to an element of a crime, whereas Tay-
lor's instruction created the risk that the jury would disregard evi-
dence that supported his affirmative defense, with respect to which
due process did not apply. 220 The majority did not explain, how-
ever, why the distinction between an element of a crime and an af-
firmative defense should make a difference. Indeed, the distinction
213 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
214 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
215 Id. at 2118 ("[I]n a noncapital case... there is no counterpart to the Eight Amend-
ment doctrine of 'constitutionally relevant evidence' in capital cases.").
216 Id at 2121 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51
(1987) ("The right to testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial has sources in several
provisions of the Constitution."); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)
("[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination
.... ") (internal quotations omitted)).
217 Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2118-19.
218 460 U.S. 73 (1983).





seems insignificant in a case like Taylor's, in which the defendant
had admitted to the elements of the crime and the only remaining
issue was the existence vel non of an affirmative defense.
The majority rejected Taylor's "right to present a defense" ar-
gument for the same reason. Although the majority acknowledged
that "the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful
opportunity to present a defense, ' 221 it noted that the cases estab-
lishing this right did not specifically deal with affirmative de-
fenses. 222 Justice Rehnquist asserted that the right to present a
defense did not include affirmative defenses, and concluded that
"such an expansive reading of our cases would make a nullity of the
rule reaffirmed in Estelle v. McGuire ... that instructional errors of
state law generally may not form the basis for federal habeas
relief."223
Justice Rehnquist would have been wise to omit the word "gen-
erally," because this word reveals that granting Taylor's claim would
in no way "nullify" the McGuire rule. The phrase "generally may
not," unlike "cannot" or "never," contemplates a rule that has ex-
ceptions. The obvious exception to the McGuire rule are errors of
state law that also violate due process and are therefore unconstitu-
tional. 224 Taylor never argued that habeas corpus be granted be-
cause of an error of state law per se. Taylor alleged that his
instruction violated due process. 225 Justice Rehnquist's circular ex-
planation did not respond to the claim.
Once this flaw becomes apparent, no justification remains for
carving out an affirmative defense exception to the right to present a
defense. As Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, the Court's precedents
establish that "the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a
meaningful opportunity to present a defense. '226 These precedents
did not state that the Constitution guarantees a meaningful oppor-
tunity to present a defense in limited circumstances, nor did they
hold that criminal defendants have a right to present all defenses
except affirmative defenses. As the majority's post hoc limitation of
precedent illustrates, the Court has let its preoccupation with final-
ity cloud its judgment.
221 Id. (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)) (internal quotations
omitted).
222 Id.
223 Id. at 2118-19.
224 See id. at 2121 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
225 Id. at 2116.
226 Id. at 2118 (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)) (internal quota-
tions omitted).
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2. The Concurrence
Although Justice O'Connor's criticisms of the majority were
well-founded, her approach left much to be desired. Her opinion
attacked the majority for its narrow reading of precedent and ac-
knowledged that whether Taylor's jury instructions violated due
process presented a difficult issue.2 27 Justice O'Connor then con-
cluded that because the answer was not clear, it was therefore "sus-
ceptible to debate among reasonable minds," and the inquiry could
go no further under Butler.228 While the majority engaged in an un-
principled analysis of the retroactivity issue, the concurrence offered
almost no analysis at all.
The concurrence reasoned that it was not "begrudging or un-
reasonable" for the Illinois courts "to hold that jury instructions
that create a reasonable likelihood the jury will not consider the [af-
firmative] defense do not violate the Constitution." 229 Such a hold-
ing is not "begrudging or unreasonable," according to Justice
O'Connor, because the Constitution does not require the State to
provide an affirmative defense of sudden and provoked passion that
reduces murder to manslaughter in the first place.23 0 While this ar-
gument may not be "begrudging or unreasonable" according to
Justice O'Connor, she revealed that she was less than convinced
when she admitted "our cases do not resolve conclusively the
question." 231
This assumption-that an affirmative defense can be disre-
garded because the Constitution does not require a state to provide
it in the first place-can survive scrutiny only under a standard of
subjective reasonableness that can be afforded only by a very strict
interpretation of Butler. However, under the standard of "objective
reasonableness" promulgated in Stringer v. Black,232 an opinion in
which Justice O'Connor herselfjoined, the argument fails. While it
is true that states are not required to distinguish between murder
and manslaughter, once a state has created the distinction by law,
due process does forbid the arbitrary application of that law. If this
was not true, and the concurrence's reasoning was correct, then tre-
mendous injustice and absurdity would be possible. For example, a
defendant who argues an affirmative defense could be deprived of
his lawyer, or his jury could be taken away, or, as was a likely possi-
227 Id. at 2120-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
228 Id. at 2120-23 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
229 Id. at 2123 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
230 Id at 2122 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
231 Id. at 2123 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
232 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992).
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bility in Taylor's case, the jury could be permitted to disregard his
defense. Due process would tolerate these deprivations because the
state does not have an obligation to provide the affirmative defense
at all.23 3
Justice O'Connor's concurrence affords to state courts precisely
the sort of deference that she implicitly and explicitly argued against
in previous decisions. In Penry v. Lynaugh,234 in which she wrote the
majority opinion, and Stringer v. Black,235 in which she joined the
majority, the Court retroactively applied rules in spite of objections
that those rules were quite susceptible to debate. Of Teague's prog-
eny, these two decisions define a "new rule" the most narrowly and
are therefore the least deferential to state court interpretations of
constitutional guarantees. 236
In Wright v. West, 237 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
flatly rejected the proposition that Teague established a deferential
standard of review of state court determinations of federal law. 23 8
Justice O'Connor argued that "the standard for determining a new
rule is objective," and she rejected the notion that "a state court's
incorrect legal determination has ever been allowed to stand be-
cause it was reasonable.- 239 On the contrary, she claimed, "[w]e
have always held that federal courts, even on habeas, have an in-
dependent obligation to say what the law is."240
In Gilmore, however, Justice O'Connor let stand a state court
interpretation based on a barely colorable argument precisely be-
cause she did not think it "begrudging or unreasonable." 241 Satis-
fied that the answer was not clear, Justice O'Connor concluded that
she could go no further without announcing a new rule.242 Whether
one calls this deference or the nonretroactivity doctrine, the result
was the same: a minimally reasonable state court interpretation of
the Constitution went unchallenged, and the "independent obliga-
tion to say what the law is" was ignored.
233 Interview with Lawrence C. Marshall, Counsel for Respondent, in Chicago, Illinois
(Sept. 22, 1993).
234 492 U.S. 303 (1989).
235 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992).
236 See supra part II.D.
237 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992).
238 Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
239 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
240 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
241 Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112, 2122-23 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
242 Id. at 2123 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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3. The Dissent
The dissent proved disappointing because it avoided the new
rule debate altogether, arguing instead that the rule sought by Tay-
lor could be applied retroactively through Teague's second excep-
tion. 243 The second exception permits the retroactive application of
"watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." 244 Justice Black-
mun argued that the Falconer rule came within this exception be-
cause the instructions at Taylor's trial created an ex post facto law,
misinformed the jury as to the governing legal principles, and de-
nied Taylor his right to a fair trial.245
The problem with this argument is that even if Justice Black-
mun is correct, these constitutional violations are probably not
enough to make the Falconer holding into the type of rule contem-
plated by the second exception, which the Court has designed and
interpreted very narrowly. 246 While the Falconer ruling probably
would have an affect on the accuracy of convictions, it does not sat-
isfy the requirement of a "watershed" rule implicating the funda-
mental fairness of the trial.247 Given the limited nature of the
second exception, the dissent should have claimed that its reasons
for finding Taylor's jury instructions unconstitutional provided rein-
forcement for the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that Falconer did not
announce a new rule.
C. CONGRESSIONAL REFORM
Congress could substantially correct the problems in Gilmore
and other applications of Teague in two simple ways: (a) it could
directly repeal Teague or (b) it could cut back on the Court's broad
definition of a new rule.2 48
Congressional repeal of Teague offers the best solution to the
"new rule" problem. First, a repeal would eliminate the blanket
prohibition on retroactive application of new rules, allowing federal
243 Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
244 Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
245 Id. at 2129 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
246 See supra part II.C.
247 The Court has never retroactively applied a rule through this exception, and it has
cited the ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing the right to
counsel in all criminal trials for serious offenses), as an example of the type of rule that is
sufficiently groundbreaking to come within the second exception. Saffle v. Parks, 494
U.S. 484, 495 (1990).
248 But see Friedman, supra note 36, at 827 (speculating that Congress would probably




courts to adjudicate claims based on their merits instead of devoting
most of their resources to announcing complicated definitions of
what is "new," "dictated by precedent," "reasonable," and "funda-
mental. ' 249 Eliminating the blanket prohibition on retroactivity
would also allow federal courts to take into account other interests
besides finality.2 50 Under the pre-Teague standards for determining
whether to apply a rule retroactively, 251 federal courts could also
consider the government's interests in enforcing the Bill of Rights,
perfecting and clarifying constitutional guarantees, prescribing min-
imum standards of due process that are consistent between the
states, and overturning unconstitutional convictions. Of course,
Congress would also do away with the Court's overinclusive defini-
tion of a new rule by repealing Teague.
Congress could also cut back on the Court's definition of a new
rule without repealing Teague by disclaiming the "susceptible to de-
bate among reasonable minds" standard announced in Butler v. Mc-
Kellar.252 In its place, Congress should articulate a narrower
definition of a new rule that, like the definition proposed by Justice
Harlan, 253 does not include logical and predictable applications of
precedent. Proposals designed to accomplish this have been in
Congress for the past several years, but as of yet, no habeas corpus
reforms have been enacted. 254 The most recent proposal defines a
new rule as "a rule that changes the constitutional or statutory stan-
dards that prevailed at the time the petitioner's conviction and sen-
tence became final on direct appeal. '255 This proposal also
prescribes a de novo standard of review for federal habeas claims,
249 See Liebman, supra note 14, at 630-32 (arguing for congressional repeal of nonret-
roactivity doctrine in part because it increases litigation and adds to the burden of the
courts).
250 For strong criticism of the Court's finality rationale, see Donald P. Lay, The Writ of
Habeas Corpus: A Complex Procedure for a Simple Process, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1015 (1993).
251 The pre-Teague standards included: (a) the purpose of the new rule, (b) extent of
reliance by state officials on the old standards and (c) the effect of retroactive application
of the new rule on the administration of justice. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297
(1967).
252 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
253 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
254 See, e.g., S. 1441, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1993) (defining a new rule as one that
"changes ... constitutional or statutory standards"); H.R. 3371, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 1104 (1991) ("[T]he term 'new rule' means a clear break from precedent, announced
by the Supreme Court ... that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time
the claimant's sentence became final in State court."); H.R. 5269, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 1305 (1990) (defining a new rule as "a sharp break from precedent" that "explicitly
and substantially changes the law" and explaining that a rule "is not new merely be-
cause, based on precedent existing before the rule's announcement, it was susceptible to
debate among reasonable minds").
255 S. 1441, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1993).
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replacing the deferential standard implicitly established by Butler.25 6
By repealing the bar against retroactivity or by redefining a new
rule in such a way that logical extensions of precedent are not re-
garded as new, Congress could eliminate the severe restrictions that
Teague and its progeny have placed on federal habeas corpus. Such
reforms would restore the federal courts' power to determine the
correct interpretation of federal rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Gilmore v. Taylor,257 the majority incorrectly reversed the Sev-
enth Circuit, ruling that the nonretroactivity doctrine barred re-
spondent Kevin Taylor's claim for federal habeas relief. To reach
this result, the majority engaged in a narrow reading of its own
cases. These cases, even under the standards set out in the Court's
complicated "new rule" jurisprudence, dictated the decision
reached by the Seventh Circuit. Exaggerating the legal relevance of
insignificant factual differences, the majority failed to provide a
meaningful basis for distinguishing these precedents.
Gilmore is the latest in a series of cases in which the Court
manipulated the nonretroactivity doctrine to curtail the scope of
federal habeas corpus. Under Gilmore, any time a federal habeas
court announces a rule that differs with a minimally reasonable state
court judgment, that federal court impermissibly makes "new" law.
Consequently, the primary authority to determine the correct inter-
pretation of federal constitutional rights rests not with federal
courts, but with the states. By placing too high a value on the final-
ity of state court convictions, the Court has forgotten what had once
been the central issue of federal habeas corpus-whether or not a
prisoner's conviction is constitutional. In the place of constitutional
adjudication, the Court has erected a complicated jurisprudence of
nonretroactivity. As Gilmore illustrates, this shift has altered the
Court's approach to habeas corpus cases. Instead of using federal
habeas to lend uniformity and clarity to constitutional criminal pro-
cedure, the Court in Gilmore seemed interested only in generating
enough confusion to ensure that Taylor's claim would fail for seek-
ing the benefit of a new rule.
TIMOTHY FINLEY
256 Id.
257 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993).
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